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Abstract
Cloud computing paradigm is emerging as the solution to all the infrastructure setup problems of IT industry. But the thriving
demand of cloud infrastructure has increased the energy consumption of the data centers drastically. As the energy consumption
of the data center rises, it leads us to high carbon emissions which are dangerous for the environment. In this paper, we propose a
green cloud broker for resource procurement problem by considering the metrics of energy efﬁciency and environmental friendly
operations of the cloud service provider. We use mechanism design methods to decide the allocation and payment for the submitted
job dynamically. We perform experiments and show the results of comparisons of energy consumption and emission of greenhouse
gases between the allocation decided by the proposed green cloud broker and a without taking the green metric into consideration.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is becoming an increasingly essential part of the business operations in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
The high scalability, ease of use, low setup cost, easy and speedy access to massive infrastructure, less total power
consumption are the advantages of cloud computing which has helped in changing the way IT businesses are started
and handled. With the growth of high speed networking facilities over the last decade, the rise in cloud usage is
astonishing. According to the International Data Corporation (IDC) report the global IT cloud services spending has
increased from $16 billion in 2008 to $42 billion in 2012, representing an annual growth of 27%. The enthralling
growth rate has attracted the attention of almost all major IT and hardware solutions providers all around the world.
Companies like Salesforce.com, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, SAP, IBM, Verizon have dedicated major parts of their
capital for the establishment, development and research in cloud computing. Amazon AWS (Amazon web services)
cloud platform reports 90% growth and as estimated by the ﬁnancial analysis ﬁrm Paciﬁc Crest, the total revenue of
AWS will double every two years and it will soon reach the target of 10% of the total revenue of Amazon1.
However, the expansion of cloud is happening at a time when global warming, climate change and energy efﬁcient
infrastructure is of paramount concern. With the increasing usage of cloud comes an increasing demand of energy.
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To deliver the efﬁcient, agile and scalable cloud services, the data centers and server farms consume incredible amount
of energy. The CO2 emissions of by server farms and data center in 2007 were 116 Metric Ton which is 14% of global
information and communication technologies (ICT) CO2 emissions. The climate group and the global e-sustainability
initiative (GeSI) reported in2 that this consumptionwill increase to 257Metric Ton which will be 18% of the global ICT
CO2 emissions by 2020. They further predict that the global carbon footprint of the main components of cloud-based
computing – data centers and the telecommunications network – would see their emissions grow, on average, 7%
and 5% respectively each year between 2002 and 2020. Underlying this analysis is the number of data centre servers
growing on average 9% each year during this period3.
Hence strict attention to research in development of energy efﬁcient cloud computing solutions is required. The
current research work suggests that companies have paid serious attention to optimizing the data centers total usage.
The power management can be done at both software and hardware level. A. Beloglazov et al.4 present a taxonomy
of all the approaches to energy efﬁciency at the system level. But one has to keep in mind that when environmental
efﬁciency and reduction in carbon footprint is concerned, not only technical optimizations are enough. As these
efﬁciencies can only slow down the growth of the emissions. The data centers can reduce their carbon footprints and
achieve necessary reductions by practicing green approach, i.e. they can shift for renewable and non conventional
sources of energy such as solar, wind or water energy. But currently no such serious efforts have been noticed by any
company. Greenpeace international5 present the statistics of the percentage of coal energy usage by the data centers
and they are suggesting that most of the companies are not serious about the source of the energy. According to that
the coal intensities of Apple 54.5%, Facebook 53.2%, HP 49.4% and IBM is 51.6%. Only a few companies have taken
steps to steer their infrastructure investments toward cleaner energy, but the sector as a whole remains focused on rapid
growth. The replacement of dirty sources of electricity with clean renewable ones is still the essential missing link in
the sustainability efforts of the sector.
In our work we analyze the various metrics available to measure the efﬁciency and environmental awareness
of a cloud service provider and we create a composite metric to aggregate all the metrics. Then we consider one
user multiple service provider allocation problem. We create a cloud broker application which takes all the QoS
speciﬁcations, costs and the green metrics for each service provider. As the user submits a request, the cloud broker
assigns one of the available service providers to the user. The allocation function takes into account all the three
parameters, namely the QoS speciﬁcations, the cost of the cloud service provider and the green metrics. As the
cost is the private information of the cloud service provider, so they may tend to become strategic and provide
the false information to the broker. Hence to ensure truthfulness we use mechanism design concepts and provide a
strategy-proof mechanism where reporting the true value becomes the most optimal strategy for the cloud service
provider6. We simulate this mechanism in a randomly generated scenario and provide the results of the allocation
values. We compare the results with the allocation without taking the suggested green metric into picture and show
how such green cloud broker applications can contribute in the green initiative.
The rest of the paper is divided into 6 sections. In section 2 we discuss all the related literature with our work.
We discuss all the current research work in the direction of green cloud computing and all the game theory and
mechanism design applications for resource procurement in cloud computing. In section 3 we formulate the problem
which we are solving. We show the method to compute an aggregate green metric and QoS metric. We discuss what
would be the optimal approach if no agent were strategic. We provide logical explanation about the problems relevance
to mechanism design and all the properties we desire to achieve in this problem. In section 4 we explain the selection
of the mechanism and we show that the mechanism holds all the desired properties. In section 5 we present the results
of our experiment and prove how our results are better. And ﬁnally section 6 we present the conclusion and future
work which can be done to help the situation.
2. Related Work
We divide our literature survey into two sub-sections. In the ﬁrst sections we present the work related with green
cloud computing and in the second section we present all the work consisting of game theory and mechanism design
applications in cloud computing resource procurement problem.
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2.1 Green cloud computing
There has been serious research work in the area of making the cloud computing greener7,8. The organizations and
government departmental programs taking active interest in this area are listed below:
• The Green Grid
• Green IT Promotion Council
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
• European Commission Joint Research center
• Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan
• Climate Group and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative
The SMART 20202 report was among the ﬁrst reports to shed the light on the rising problem of the energy consumption
and CO2 emission by information and communication technologies industries. Kurp et al.9 presented the risks of
the pollution due to computing industry and presented the optimal view of a consumer. ODCA8 provides speciﬁc
solutions and enterprise IT groups involved in planning, operations, and procurement to business decision makers and
deﬁning standards for standardization institutes. In7 report the authors deﬁne and provide measurement guidelines for
the green cloud metrics such as Power Usage Effectiveness, Green Energy Coefﬁcient (GEC), Energy Reuse Factor
(ERF) and Carbon Usage Effectiveness (CUE). We use these metric and calculation information later in our paper
as the basis for composite metric calculation. The report U.S. EPA10 provides the data about trends in growth and
energy use associated with servers and data centers in U.S. They discuss various methods of energy and cost savings
methods using energy efﬁciency. They give the recommendations on incentives and voluntary programs. U.S. energy
information administration11 provides the instructions on voluntary reporting of greenhouse gases form EIA 1605.
S. Garg et al.3 explain how all components of a cloud computing environment contibut to energy consumption and the
solution for future research directions to enable green cloud computing. S. Garg et al.12 provide a user oriented cloud
architectural framework called Carbon Aware Green Cloud Architecture which addresses the environmental problem
with overall usage of cloud computing resources. A. Belogazov et al.4 will be a good reference to look at if one wants
to explore more in optimizing energy usage in cloud.
2.2 Game theory and mechanism design applications for resource procurement in cloud computing
The issue of multi service provider and one user scenario have been handled using game theory and mechanism
design in various works. Z. Kong et al.13 utilize mechanism design to allocate resources among selﬁsh virtual machines
in a non-cooperative cloud computing environment. They apply stochastic approximation as the procurement of the
parameters needed to deﬁne the allocation function may not be noise-free. In our problem we consider the allocation
among various users and how user completes the job is transparent to us. D. Niyato et al.15 present the idea of resource
and revenue sharing with a coalition formation in cloud service providers. This idea is related to the cloud broker
application but however in our problem we do not let the cloud service provider share the submitted job as the job
is an indivisible entity in our scenario. They do not consider any green approach and the division and allocation are
based on the valuation only. They suggest a stochastic linear programming game to ﬁnd the allocation and payment
function. The approach by A. Prasad16 is similar to our approach in some ways. They propose three mechanisms
named C-DSIC, C-BIC and C-OPT which are the application of VCG, d-AGVA and optimal mechanisms. But they
neither consider any green parameters nor incentivize environmental friendly cloud service provider in their literature.
Hence we believe our proposed idea is unique as the amalgamation of green cloud computing and mechanism design
is not proposed by anyone to the best of our knowledge. For more applications of game theory and mechanism design
concepts in resource procurement problems17,18 are good survey papers to refer.
3. Problem Formulation
3.1 Problem deﬁnition
We base our model on the mechanism design models explained by Y. Narahari et al.6 We assume that all the cloud
service providers participating in the process are rational and they aim to maximize their utility. Their utility in this
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case is the revenue they receive from the completion of the job. Here we have n cloud service providers participating
in the mechanism design setting. The cloud user submits the job to the cloud broker with the QoS speciﬁcation and
cost they are ready to pay for the job. The cloud broker is a automated software which has all the information about
the cloud service providers19. The information consists of the QoS speciﬁcation, minimum cost they would charge
for the job and the values of all the green metric we take into consideration which are Power Usage Effectiveness
(PUE), Green Energy Coefﬁcient (GEC), Energy Reuse Factor (ERF) and Carbon Usage Effectiveness (CUE). The
calculation of the metric is explained in7 with all the details. Hence we delegate the task of providing the broker
the value of the metrics to the cloud service provider. Now we can assume safely that the values of this metrics
cannot be reported falsely because if it is, then it becomes a legal issue for the cloud service providers and they can
charged heavily for that. The cloud broker here is a software application which takes all the values described above
as inputs. It becomes open to accept the jobs from cloud users. Once it receives the job, it computes the allocation
and payment by the mechanism design principles and passes the job to the selected service provider. As the service
provider ﬁnishes the job, the broker collects the payment from the user and transfers it to the service provider and
simultaneously collects the results from the cloud service provider and passes it on to the cloud user. Hence the
interaction is always mediated through the broker. It is completely transparent to the cloud user how the execution takes
place.
3.2 Calculation of a composite green metric
The information about the green metrics that we are using for our composite metric calculation is given in Table 1.
For the calculation of the composite metric we us the Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) method described in20.
A holistic framework7 approach suggested allows the user to be aware about the effect of changes made to the data
center speciﬁc to the various suggested metrics. For example, if one improvement at a data center that is targeted to
improve a speciﬁc performancemetric, it may have made the result of another metric look worse. Hence such a holistic
framework helps the operator keep in mind the effects on all metrics simultaneously. But for our calculation we need
to weigh each metric with respect to the other metrics and get one value of a composite metric which represents the
environmental awareness of the cloud service provider as a whole. Now we assume that Ai,k is the value of the green
metric k of the service provider i . The values acquired during the input collection by the broker. We construct a matrix
A = {Ai, j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}. Each row of the matrix corresponds to the green metrics of the cloud service
provider i . Let B = {Bi, j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k} be the matrix and Bi,k be the normalized value of the green
parameter Ai,k .
The SAW method can be divided into two individual stages of evaluation as:
3.2.1 Scaling
For all the metrics we have, we need to redirect all the parameters and scale them accordingly. Now the parameters
can be either positive or negative. So we need two different equations to scale them. For the scaling of the negative
parameters we use the following equation:
Bi, j =
{
max( j )−Ai, j
max( j )−min( j ) if max( j) = min( j)
1 else
(1)
For the scaling of the positive parameters we use the following equation:
Bi, j =
{ Ai, j −min j
max( j )−min( j ) if max( j) = min( j)
1 else
(2)
The scaled parameters will be in [0,1] and there will show positive behavior. By positive behavior we mean that more
the value of the parameter, more aware the cloud service provider is about that factor. The information about the
scaling of the parameters we use is given in Table 2.
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Table 1. Behaviour, calculation information and weight for the metrics.
Metric Behaviour Minimum value Maximum value Scaling required Equation Weight
PUE Negative 1 max (available inputs) Yes eqn 1 0.1
GEC Positive 0 1 No N.A. 0.5
ERF Positive 0 1 No N.A. 0.15
CUE Negative 0 max (available inputs) Yes eqn 1 0.35
Table 2. Description of the metrics.
Metric Description Formulation
PUE Power Usage Effectiveness PUE = Total Data Center Source energyIT equipment energy
GEC Green Energy Coefﬁcient GEC = Green Energy Used by the Data CenterTotal Data center Source Energy
ERF Energy Reuse Effectiveness ERF = Reuse energy outside of the Data CenterTotal Data Center Source energy
CUE Carbon Usage Effectiveness CUE = Total CO2emmissions caused by the Total data center energyIT equipment energy
3.2.2 Weighting





Bi, j ∗ w j where w j ∈ [0, 1] and
k∑
j=1
w j = 1 (3)
The values of the weights are taken from Table 2. Hence the all green metric are aggregated to a number. Now we
need to scale the number by a scaling function. We use the following function to scale values.
Gi = 1 + si (4)
Here the values of the weights are taken by observation of the importance of the factor. A different scheme for weights
can be taken to take the result in a different direction. Similarly the scaling function can be changed to change the
strictness of the mechanism. The effect of the change in scaling function on the strictness on mechanism is explained
in the next section.
3.3 Relevance of mechanism design to this problem
The problem of the allocation of the job as described above is essentially a decision or optimization problem with
incomplete information. Now our scenario has three speciﬁc characteristics25,26.
1. A set of cloud service providers who interact in a strategic way. They want to maximize their revenue and all of
them are assumed to be rational. Now as job is indivisible entity, only one player will be allocated the job and
only that player will get a chance to earn revenue. Hence the objectives of the players are clearly conﬂicting.
2. Each service provider holds private information which no one has any way to know and only the player knows
this deterministically. This information is the cost which the service provider will incur by completing the job
assigned to it. Thus, this is the situation of incomplete and decentralized information. There is some information
such as QoS value, green metric which is a common knowledge among the player.
3. Each service provider has a choice set of values from which it can select one value which will maximize its
generated revenue. This availability of choices results in strategic actions by the player which may result in false
reporting of the cost.
Now we need the system-wide solution to satisfy some desirable properties. The best way to achieve is induce a game
amongst the service providers and let them decide their strategy. As everyone will know the allocation and payment
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Table 3. Symbol table.
Symbol Description
n Number of service providers
N Set of the service providers
X Set of outcome
qi QoS composite of service provider i
θi Preference/type of the service provider i
ci Cost of the service provider i
c′i Reported cost of the service provider i
Gi Green composite metric of service provider i
i Set of types of service provider i
ti Payment for service provider i
ki Allocation for service provider i
vi Valuation for service provider i
b Bid Vector
function, they will optimize their strategies (reported cost) to achieve the maximum possible revenue. So if the broker
decides the allocation and the payment functions in such way that the optimized strategies of each player satisfy all the
properties the broker wants the system to have. Such a reverse engineering of the game theory is done by mechanism
design. Mechanism design provides the setting where a social planner mechanism designer (broker) faces the problem
of the aggregation of the reported preferences-types of multiple players (service providers) into a collective decision
when the real preferences-types are unknown. The social choice function describes the collective decision. It takes all
the reported types as input and gives the collective decision-outcome as output. Each player (service provider) will
have predeﬁned utility function which maps the actual type of the player and the outcome to a real number which
suggests the happiness of the player6,27, 28.
3.4 Desired properties
3.4.1 Incentive compatibility
If no player receives any more utility by reporting false preference than by reporting the true preference, such
mechanism is called an incentive compatible mechanism. In such mechanism the best response for the player is to
report the true value of their preference. There exists a Nash equilibriumor weakly dominant strategy equilibrium in the
games generated by suchmechanisms. If there is Nash equilibrium, then a player cannot do any better by reporting false
preference than the true preference; given that all other player report their true preference. Such mechanisms are called
Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible mechanism (BIC). If there is weakly dominant strategy equilibrium, then a player
cannot do any better by reporting false preference than the true preference in any circumstances. Such mechanisms
are called Dominant Strategy Incentive compatible mechanisms (DSIC). This is a strategy-proof situation where the
player has no other option then reporting the truth. Such mechanisms are also called truth-revealing mechanisms. This
is an extremely desirable property in our scenario.
3.4.2 Pareto-efﬁciency or ex-post efﬁciency
If the outcome produced by the social choice function is such that, there is no other outcome possible, which will
make some players gain more utility and the remaining gets the same utility as they were getting with the produced
outcome. Hence the outcome is the best for all players with their current preferences.
3.4.3 Allocative efﬁciency
A mechanism is called allocatively efﬁcient if the allocation of the resources is done to the player who values it the
most. Such property is extremely desirable in our case.
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3.4.4 Budget balance
When the sum of all monetary transfer is equal to or less than zero, then such mechanism is called budget balanced.
That suggests that there is no deﬁcit in the mechanism and the mechanism will run without any monetary support
from outside. If the sum is equal to zero then it corresponds to strong budget balance which implies no surplus and
no deﬁcit. Such mechanisms are self sustainable. If the sum is less than zero than there is a surplus of money in the
mechanism which can be consumed by the broker or market maker.
3.4.5 Individual Rationality
A mechanism is individually rational if the participating player does not receive more utility by not participating
in the mechanism design. If the mechanism is not individually rational then there is a possibility that the agents for
which it is not rational; they can withdraw from the mechanism.
4. Mechanism Design Solution
4.1 Selection of the mechanism
As in the literature for mechanism design there are various mechanisms available such Vickry-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms29, d-AGVA mechanisms30, Mysersons optimal mechanisms31. All mechanisms provide various
properties which are discussed above. Now for this scenario we require a mechanism to be DSIC and AE. We do
not want to give up on these two properties. Besides these, the property of strong budget balance is desirable. But
it is impossible to design any mechanism such that it satisﬁes SBB in addition to AE and DSIC25,31–33. And as
we do not want to sacriﬁce on AE and DSIC we cannot include SBB in our mechanism. Among VCG mechanism
Groves mechanism is the most general one; however for the current scenario the Clarke mechanism sufﬁces. Clarke
mechanism satisﬁes both the properties, DSIC and AE, which we require. Hence we use Clarke mechanism as the
ﬁrst approach to solve the problem29.
4.2 Clarke-pivotal mechanism
In our problem setting we have n cloud service providers which are represented by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Now in
this procurement procedure each service provider submits a bid consisting of the green composite metric, the QoS
composite metric as calculated in the section above and the total cost as an ordered pair (Gi , qi , ci ). Now the cost is
the private information of the cloud service provider, he can lie about it in order to get more revenue. Hence cost can
be from the interval [c, c]. Now the cloud service provider has to report the true value of QoS composite index and
Green composite index because false reporting of these values can lend the service provider into legal troubles. Hence
the cost of the cloud service provider becomes its type-preference value. Hence, θi = ci . Now the following are the
















vi (k(θ), θi ) = −k(θ) ∗ θi (6)
Now it is clear from the valuation and allocation function that if the scale of the green composite metric is changed,
it changes the valuation function which decides the allocation. Hence the scale of the green composite metric affects
the strictness of the mechanism. We deﬁned the Allocative efﬁciency of a mechanism above. The mathematical





vi (k, θi ) ∀θ ∈  (7)
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Algorithm 1. Algorithm to Compute the Winner and the Payment




v j (k∗(θ), θ j ) −
∑
j =i
v j (k∗−i (θ−i ), θ j ) (8)
4.3 Analysis of the model
According to the properties of the clarke mechanism as mentioned earlier, the proposed solution achieves the
desirable properties. In the Clarke-Pivotal mechanism the payment to the winner is the difference between the sum of
valuation of the players other than the winner in the presence and the absence of the player. As it is clearly visible by
the eqn 9 that all other players other than the winner of the allocation receive zero revenue. Hence the mechanism is
individually rational. Our allocation function is trivially AE. And it is the property of the Clarke mechanism that it
achieves DSIC. Thus the allocation happens to the cloud service provider whose valuation function. Hence, we can
observe that the proposed solution perfectly ﬁts the scenario theoretically.
5. Experimental Analysis
For the evaluation of the mechanism we suggested above we do not use standard CloudSim or any such toolkit for
various reasons. We use a python based implementation of the Clarke-Pivotal mechanism with the allocation, valuation
and payment function described in the section above. The highlights of our simulation approach are as follows:
1. For the resource prices we used the lognormal distribution in the interval of [6000,8000] as described by A. Prasad
et al.16 We limit the interval to observe the allocations with nearer price values.
2. As we wanted to evaluate the mechanism and do not perform the calculation at cloud service provider level we
took QoS parameters as normal distribution with mean and variance value 5 to facilitate rating on the scale of 10.
3. The values of the green composite index before applying scaling function are taken as normal distribution with
mean and variance 0.5 and then the scaling function is applied on them.
4. As simulation software for cloud applications such as CloudSim or Eucalyptus do not provide any support for
auction protocols or price generations. Hence we had to use the python based simulation to evaluate the equations
we presented in the section above.
Table 4 presents the data related to our simulation. The graphs in Fig. 1 show the comparison between the cost
values and the green composite metric values in both the cases. Here the important result to notice in Fig. 1 is that the
when the green metric is considered in the mechanism, the value of the green metric of the winner is always greater
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Table 4. Results.
Without considering the G With G included
No of service provider Received payment G for the winner Received payment G for the winner
10 6847.64148956 1.55687953372 6847.64148956 1.68015781945
20 7070.31178585 1.02544157473 6029.57376142 1.912851502
30 6932.86812016 1.48943558642 6206.14430889 1.82215648839
40 6510.62811092 1.29429167992 6931.70474788 1.7861603046
50 6432.46891114 1.55862234117 7101.62660025 1.92278446451
60 6700.56822365 1.15582927758 6608.89015437 1.98169366761
70 6341.89304004 1.19365526973 6551.90621447 1.83848702292
80 6845.06448055 1.73241749049 6129.86051091 1.9670920235
90 6788.3181607 1.506158094 6938.23422267 1.94869813212
100 6276.20197097 1.69768612629 6674.13065512 1.69768612629
200 6227.42511039 1.7560932211 7280.97873435 1.89096285245
300 6176.86925999 1.43981744393 6176.86925999 1.95096740578
400 6141.75621733 1.76464986526 6307.36845192 1.96467046105
500 6190.64958101 1.47081132581 6351.6756224 1.93796293865
1000 6079.18866319 1.92768202371 6159.3965151 1.93448792893
Fig. 1. Simulation results.
than the value of green metric of the winner in the other case. Hence the service provider with more energy efﬁcient
cloud is given priority over the less efﬁcient cloud. Figure 1 shows that there is no trend in the payment comparison to
the winner which is a good result because there are some cases where the allocation happens to a cheaper and greener
cloud service provider. But one needs to keep in mind the allocation function while comparing the result. If such case
occurs than it will be a cloud service provider with less QoS value. Thus, our simulation prove that our mechanism is
successful in choosing the greener cloud service provider.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We conclude that the mechanism proposed in this paper helps the cause of environmental awareness in information
and communication technologies. The cloud broker application selects cloud service providers with higher green
composite metric. This can result into user paying more money. But as the allocation function takes green composite
metric and cost as inputs, the cost difference which the cloud user pays extra won’t be an extremely higher value. The
mechanism proposed by us is able to automate the selection of the cloud service provider and it reduces a lot of time
overhead for the cloud user.
We believe that there is still scope for improvement in the assignment of weights to the different metric to measure
the efﬁciency and environmental awareness. The scaling functions can be optimized to achieve results which are
environment centric.
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